



Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Is Household Debt
Inhibiting the Recovery?
by David Altig, Susan M. Byrne, and Katherine A. Samolyk
When the profits of trade happen to
be greater than ordinary, overtrading
becomes a general error both among
great and small dealers. They do not
always send more money abroad than
usual, but they buy upon credit both at
home and abroad an unusual quantity
of goods.... The demand comes before
the returns, and they have nothing at
hand with which they can either pur-
chase money or give solid security for
borrowing.
Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, 1776.
Forecasting short-run economic activity
is a tenuous business. Though all eco-
nomic contractions and expansions have
certain well-defined characteristics, his-
tory never completely replicates itself.
Thus, the particulars of past economic
downturns are distinct, and the task of
forecasters is something of an art — that
of identifying the relevant caveat in the
current economic outlook.
One particular of the most recent reces-
sion and the current period of sluggish
economic activity — a particular in
most forecasters' bag of caveats — is
the level of household debt. By the end
of 1990, the ratio of household debt
outstanding to disposable income was
at a historically high 99 percent. The
corresponding ratio of household debt
to assets stood at a similarly unprece-
dented 19 percent.
Many observers believe that such
household debt burdens will, at the very
least, constrain consumer spending and
inhibit the economy's recovery from
recession. This concern was succinctly
expressed in a May 1991 Wall Street
Journal editorial: "What's different about
this recession — what is retarding or
blocking these normal financial responses
to recession — is the abnormally heavy
burden of... household debt."
Implicit in this argument is the pre-
sumption that the borrowing behavior
of the 1980s has significantly weak-
ened the viability of consumer financial
positions. Two fundamental concerns
are at the core of this presumed weak-
ness. First is the issue of consumers'
ability to service debt in the short run,
which is generally viewed as being in-
versely related to household debt-to-
income ratios. Second is the issue of
consumers' solvency, or their ability to
pay off debts in the long run. A house-
hold is solvent as long as its assets are
greater in value than its liabilities. The
probability of insolvency is therefore
generally viewed to be inversely related
to a household's debt-to-asset ratio.
But how relevant are observations such
as "the ratio of household debt to income
is 99 percent" or "the ratio of house-
hold debt to assets is 19 percent" when
evaluating patterns in business activity?
Although rarely discussed in popular
debates, a complete analysis of the
In the 1980s, the ratios of household
debt to income and household debt to
assets reached historically high levels,
causing some to conclude that the
financial fragility of consumers has
substantially decreased the econ-
omy's ability to fight its way out of
recession. Examined in a historical
context, however, this recent pattern
of debt and asset levels is not unusual,
and there is little evidence to suggest
that the consumer debt buildup of the
last decade is playing any greater role
now than did the debt positions of
households in previous recessions.
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activity requires a distinction between
the level of debt-to-asset and debt-to-
income ratios and changes in the level
of these ratios. Stated alternatively, assess-
ing the role of debt in business-cycle
fluctuations requires distinguishing be-
tween the effects of trend behavior in
household debt and the cyclical behavior
of such debt.
Existing theoretical and empirical re-
search does implicate household debt
as a factor in propagating (if not in fact
causing) downturns in economic activ-
ity. Yet, no convincing case has been
made, and we believe none exists, for
the claim that the current household
debt situation and its effects on overall
economic activity are in any way ex-
traordinary by historical standards.
In this Economic Commentary, we ex-
amine trends in household debt burdens
in their historical context. We propose
that the much-maligned growth in debt-
to-asset and debt-to-income ratios that
characterized the 1980s appears to be a
return to a long-term trend that, for
whatever reason, was interrupted in the
1970s. In fact, these debt measures have
been increasing since the turn of the
century. If the severity and length of
recessions are truly correlated to the
level of household leverage, then past
recessions should have exhibited in-
creasing amplitude and duration over
time. This does not appear to have been
the case.
We also examine cyclical patterns in
household debt-to-income and debt-to-
asset ratios over the post-World War II
period. Although these patterns may be
important for understanding the short-run
performance of the macroeconomy, an
aggregate perspective yields little evi-
dence that the consumer debt buildup of
the 1980s played any greater role in our
present economic fortunes than did the
debt positions of households in previous
recessions. Consequently, we believe that
if the current sluggishness of the U.S.
economy is truly an anomalous circum-
stance frustrating our best forecasters,
then the burden must arise from some
beast other than the aggregate level of
household debt.
• Balance Sheets, Financial
Fragility, and Economic Activity
As the opening quote from Adam
Smith indicates, concerns about debt
accumulation and its potential impact on
economic activity are hardly a recent phe-
nomenon. And although our understand-
ing of the role of credit markets in the
business cycle has advanced dramatically
in the past 15 years or so, the essential
intuition was captured by Irving Fisher
in 1933:
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There may be an equilibrium which,
though stable, is so delicately poised
that, after departure from it beyond
certain limits, instability ensues, just
as, at first, a stick may bend under
strain, ready all the time to bend back,
until a certain point is reached, when
it breaks. The simile probably applies
when a debtor gets "broke," or when
the breaking of many debtors con-
stitutes a "crash".... (p. 339)
In other words, debt levels that are not
problematic in good times may turn
out to be the vehicle for increasing dif-
ficulty during bad times.
An essential feature of arguments that
have followed in the tradition of Fisher's
analysis is that cyclical increases in the
ratio of household debt to assets heighten
the probability of financial distress be-
cause they diminish consumers' ability
to meet contractual debt obligations and
further limit their access to credit markets
through a reduction in the collateral
base. To maintain the integrity of their
balance sheets, consumers may there-
fore shift their desired asset holdings
away from durable consumption goods
and toward more liquid financial assets.
In "normal" times, the process of finan-
cial intermediation would channel these
resources into alternative investment
opportunities. However, in times of
general economic distress, the reduced
ability of lenders to separate bad bor-
rowers from good, and the costs asso-
ciated with defaults and delinquencies,
can inhibit the performance of loan
markets. Thus, adverse shocks to the
economy can be amplified by increasing
restrictiveness on the part of lenders, who
find their own balance sheets deterior-
ating and who face increasing difficul-
ties in assessing the financial viability
of potential borrowers.
Thus, even if recessions are not caused
by high debt-to-asset or debt-to-income
levels, cyclical increases may magnify
the economy's exposure to payment and
bankruptcy problems in the event of
temporary declines in economic activity.
The direct and indirect effects of credit
problems on household consumption
demand and investment, and the result-
ing direct or indirect effects on aggre-
gate production, can play an important
role in determining the duration and
severity of a recession.
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Several prominent economists have
found evidence that financial stress in
the household sector can exacerbate neg-
ative shocks to the macroeconomy.
Frederic Mishkin has argued that deteri-
oration of household balance sheets —
in the form of increasing debt-to-asset
ratios — prolonged and deepened both
the 1974-1975 recession and the Great
Depression. Similar arguments have been
made by Ben Bernanke.
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• Household Debt in the 1980s:
The Age of Profligacy or a Return
to Normalcy?
Evidence of the type cited by Bernanke and
Mishkin has caused both policymakers
and private analysts to fear, if not conclude,
that the unprecedented levels of household
debt realized by the end of the 1980s have
substantially decreased the ability of the
U.S. economy to fight its way out of reces-
sion. The logic of this concern, taken at
face value, is persuasive: Since debt bur-
dens are extraordinarily high by historical
standards, wouldn't we expect the con-
straining effect of such burdens to be all
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a. Average monthly percent decrease in the Industrial Production Index.
b. Estimated.
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A look at the data does confirm the gen-
eral impression that U.S. consumers have
accumulated debt at a rapid pace since the
1981-1982 recession. From the first quar-
ter of 1983 to the end of 1990, the house-
hold debt-to-asset ratio rose by one-third,
from 12 percent to 16 percent. Over the
same period, the debt-to-income ratio rose
from 73 percent to 99 percent.
However, these increases seem remark-
able only when compared with the expe-
rience of the 1970s. As indicated by figure
1, the 3.7 percent average annual growth
rate in the household debt-to-asset ratio
from 1983 through 1990 closely matches
the average rate of 3.5 percent realized
from 1952 through 1967. In fact, house-
hold debt as a percentage of net worth
has been increasing since at least the
turn of the century.
Figure 2 illustrates the trend behavior of
the household debt-to-income ratio over
the postwar period. The pattern is very
similar to that of the debt-to-asset ratio
shown in figure 1. Specifically, the debt-
to-income ratio grew consistently from
1952 until about 1967, stalled from the
late 1960s to the early 1980s, and then
returned to its earlier trend.
From this longer-term perspective, dele-
terious effects of the trend toward higher
debt-to-asset and debt-to-income ratios
are not apparent. In particular, the inci-
dence, magnitude, or persistence of mac-
roeconomic distress does not appear to be
reliably or consistently related to the level
of household debt. This observation is re-
inforced by examining table 1, which
reports debt levels at the peak of each offi-
cially designated recession since 1950.
Clearly, debt-to-asset and debt-to-income
ratios have generally been higher at the
outset of each successive recession. In
fact, the two longest and most severe
downturns of the entire postwar period —
the 1974-1975 and 1981-1982 contrac-
tions — were the only instances in which
one or both of the debt measures were
lower at the beginning of a recession than
at the previous peak.The historical pattern of household debt
accumulation likely reflects the increas-
ing sophistication of financial markets.
These changes not only permit a more
efficient allocation of resources, thus
enhancing overall consumption and in-
vestment opportunities, but also provide
the mechanisms by which financial mar-
kets are better able to withstand the pres-
sures of economic downturns. Indeed,
the only postwar period during which
the household debt-to-asset ratio failed
to rise substantially was the 1970s, hardly
a period with an economic performance
worth repeating.
• Debt and Recessions
In the long run, then, there appears to be
little evidence that high household debt
levels are negatively related to economic
activity. But does debt play any role in the
short run? In particular, does the behavior
of household debt-to-asset ratios distin-
guish the 1990-1991 recession from other
postwar downturns?
FIGURE 3 DEBT-TO-ASSET INDEX
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Figure 3 depicts the behavior of house-
hold debt-to-asset ratios around business-
cycle troughs for all postwar recessions,
with the exception of the brief down-
turn of 1980.
7 To emphasize cyclical
patterns and to maintain comparability,
the two panels present a debt-to-asset
index for each recession, where the index
takes the value one at each business-
cycle trough. Panel A plots index values
for the 1953-1954,1957-1958, 1960-
1961, and 1990-1991 recessions. Panel
B plots index values for the 1969-1970,
1974-1975, and 1981-1982 recessions.
We assume the latest business-cycle
trough was in the second quarter of 1991.
A fairly consistent pattern emerges. Typi-
cally, debt-to-asset ratios increase until
one or two quarters prior to the business-
cycle trough, at which point they drop
off before resuming the trend growth rates
apparent in figure 1. These declines are
more pronounced, and of longer dura-
tion, in the recessions from 1969 to 1982
shown in panel B, a period when growth
in debt-to-asset ratios was minimal.
Index, trough quarter = 1
FIGURE 4 DEBT-TO-INCOME INDEX
IN POSTWAR RECESSIONS
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Federal Reserve System.Of special interest is that the pattern for
the 1990-1991 recession is fully consis-
tent with those of other postwar reces-
sions. Also, looking at debt and assets
separately would indicate that movements
in the debt-to-asset ratio are driven pri-
marily by changes in the value of house-
hold assets, while short-run changes in
household liabilities deviate little from
their long-run trend. Although the recent
recession has exhibited a decrease in as-
sets and an increase in the debt-to-asset
ratio, these changes are not appreciably
different from those of other downturns.
Analogous to figure 3, figure 4 shows the
behavior of household debt-to-income
ratios in and around recessions. As before,
the ratios are reported as an index, equal
to one at the trough of the recession, in
order to emphasize cyclical patterns and
to maintain comparability.
Figure 4 reveals no evident pattern in the
behavior of debt-to-income ratios during
recessions. Indeed, these ratios appear to
be almost entirely dominated by the trend
that existed at the time of the downturn:
Debt-to-income ratios were essentially
flat for the 16 quarters surrounding the
troughs of the 1969-1970, 1974-1975,
and 1981-1982 recessions; the ratios
tended to grow consistently through the
troughs of the 1953-1954, 1957-1958,
1960-1961, and 1990-1991 recessions.
• Cross-Sectional Caveats
Although the recent pattern of debt and
asset levels is not unusual, it could be that
circumstances underlying these numbers
make the current environment riskier than
usual. Of particular concern are the possi-
bilities that recent growth in household
debt is concentrated among households
where solvency is in question and that the
trend in debt-to-asset and debt-to-income
ratios reflects a diminished ability to serv-
ice debt in the short run.
Direct evidence on these questions is slim,
and indirect evidence is mixed. As noted
above, there is generally a positive link
between debt-to-income ratios, bankrupt-
cies, and payment problems. A study of
the 1983 and 1986 Survey of Consumer
Finances did find that the share of aggre-
gate debt payments held by households
with high debt-to-income ratios rose sub-
stantially between 1983 and 1986.
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However, the 1986 study also suggests
that, due to changes in debt maturity and
loan rates, conventional debt measures
may not be useful indicators of excessive
debt-service burdens. Furthermore, much
of the increase since 1986 has been due
to growth in borrowing through home
equity loans. Because home equity lines
of credit tend to be held by high-income
households, distress is less likely to origi-
nate with debt positions from this source.
Also, evidence from the 1989 Survey of
Consumer Finances indicates that much
of the personal debt increase since 1983
has been accounted for by households
reporting the most financial assets.
Still, cross-sectional factors may indeed
be important. But the evidence linking
these factors to aggregate debt-to-income
or debt-to-asset ratios is still lacking. More-
over, it is far from clear that cross-sectional
relationships at a particular time are useful
for making inferences about the effects of
long-term trends in household leverage.
• Conclusion
It is not our intention to dismiss out of
hand all concerns about the financial
fragility of the household sector. Nor do
we believe that we should be entirely
sanguine about the debt buildup of the
1980s. National saving rates, conven-
tionally measured, were especially low
over the past decade. To the extent that
trends in household leverage reflect a
shift away from providing future con-
sumption opportunities, such trends
may be a cause for concern.
Instead, we contend that the highly empha-
sized increase in household leverage dur-
ing the past decade seems to be a return to
a long-run trend that was interrupted
during the 1970s. Furthermore, control-
ling for this trend, it does not appear that
current household debt levels have resulted
in cyclical effects that distinguish our
latest recession from earlier ones. To the
extent that economic recovery is (so far)
less robust than in past recessions, the
reason will likely be found in explanations
that do not rely on the presumed irrespon-
sibility of consumers in the 1980s.• Footnotes
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